



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

9 April 1979

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
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


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
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Situation Report



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
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
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
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RHODESIA: Election Timetable

*White Rhodesians will go to the polls tomorrow to choose four of the 20 directly elected white members of the House of Assembly in the black-led government scheduled to be installed late next month. White officials apparently have decided for security reasons not to hold elections in the other 16 districts where candidates from Prime Minister Smith's Rhodesian Front Party are running unopposed.*

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Black and white Rhodesians will vote over a five-day period beginning 17 April to elect 72 black representatives to the House. Black leader Bishop Muzorewa's party is expected to win over half these seats, and Muzorewa should emerge in a strong position of leadership in the black-led government.

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A series of indirect elections will be held in May to elect an additional eight whites to the House as well as 10 blacks, 10 whites, and 10 tribal chiefs to the Senate. Once the last of these elections is held on 23 May, the current parliament will be dissolved and the new 130-member parliament will be formed. It then will elect the President, who appoints the Prime Minister. Negotiations over the composition of the new government could be intense, delaying the formal installation of the government until sometime in June.

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## SOUTH AFRICA: Harassment of Urban Blacks

*South African police recently have stepped up harassment and intimidation in Soweto, the black township of over 1.5 million people on the outskirts of Johannesburg that was the focal point of the riots that swept South Africa nearly three years ago. Some prominent local leaders believe a new violent confrontation may be building between young people and the police.* [REDACTED]

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Government raids in Soweto probably are intended to suppress urban terrorists. They may also be designed to cull illegal residents in an attempt to cut the high unemployment rate and relieve Soweto's severe housing shortage. [REDACTED]

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There is speculation among blacks, however, that the police may be deliberately provoking the Soweto community to bring on confrontations that will help identify some of the radical Marxist-oriented youths whom they believe have infiltrated the township during the past year. Since the government security crackdown in late 1977 on moderate black leaders and organizations, the basically passive black consciousness movement has been losing its appeal to many young urban blacks who see violence as their only alternative. [REDACTED]

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It is unclear whether the rising number of arrests are part of an overall government strategy or merely a local authority initiative; the number of blacks arrested in the Cape Province has increased sharply over the past year, while police actions against blacks in some parts of the Transvaal have decreased dramatically. Tension in the black townships does not appear to have reached the level that precipitated the violence that occurred in mid-1976, but continued police sweeps are bound further to embitter urban blacks. [REDACTED]

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#### PAKISTAN: Protests Subside

Pakistan was relatively quiet this weekend following scattered, violent protests on Friday against the execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto. Some minor demonstrations continue, but the police are acting cautiously and appear to be in complete control. A tense atmosphere remains, however, and renewed antigovernment agitation could materialize. The US decision to cut off economic assistance to Pakistan, featured in the Pakistani press on Saturday, may be interpreted by President Zia's domestic opponents as a lack of confidence by the US in his regime, and encourage them to resume their antigovernment activities.

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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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USSR: Kirilenko's Status

[REDACTED]

*The sudden demotion of Party Secretary Yakov Ryabov in mid-February was but one of several recent indications of slippage in the position of his patron Andrey Kirilenko, the man widely considered best placed to succeed President Brezhnev as party leader. Kirilenko still appears to be in the strongest position among the few viable contenders to succeed Brezhnev, even though at 72 he might be only an interim successor. Ryabov's setback, however, together with increased prominence and responsibility accorded to another of Kirilenko's Secretariat colleagues, longtime Brezhnev associate Konstantin Chernenko, raises serious questions about Kirilenko's prospects and further clouds the succession picture.* [REDACTED]

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The appointment of Ryabov as one of five first deputy chairmen of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) is a significant demotion because, however important his new duties, he will have to give up his much more powerful post in the Secretariat, where for the past two years he has supervised defense industry and security-related matters. Ryabov, who has not functioned in his secretarial capacity since 13 February, will doubtless formally be removed from the Secretariat when the Central Committee meets in plenary session next week. The man who assumes Ryabov's defense-industrial job will need prior party experience in industrial affairs. [REDACTED]

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The first suggestion that Kirilenko's position might be in danger was Chernenko's promotion to Politburo membership last November. This was the logical outgrowth of Brezhnev's boosting of Chernenko's career, beginning with his appointment as party secretary in 1976 and followed by his elevation to Politburo candidate in 1977. It is not at all clear, however, that Brezhnev intended to undercut Kirilenko's position in the Secretariat. On the contrary, it could be argued that Brezhnev's intentions were to have Chernenko and Kirilenko work as a team to offset the influence of Politburo and Secretariat member Suslov and Premier Kosygin. [REDACTED]

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The protocol treatment and publicity for Chernenko since November also tend to cast a shadow on Kirilenko's fortunes. The honorary nominations received by Chernenko during the Supreme Soviet election campaign earlier this year clearly established him, immediately after Kirilenko, in the fifth-ranking position formerly occupied by Fedor Kulakov, the senior party secretary who died last summer. Also, TASS accorded Chernenko the honorific of "prominent party and state figure" in connection with the campaign, while naming Kirilenko simply a "prominent party figure"--a double slight inasmuch as Kirilenko had had the more prestigious epithet during the 1974 and 1975 election campaigns. Further, in accompanying Brezhnev to Bulgaria in January, Chernenko had the distinction of being treated by Soviet media as a co-invitee rather than simply a member of the party leader's delegation. [REDACTED]

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Kirilenko clearly has not fallen entirely from grace. As in the past, he has performed a number of important duties in the sphere of planning and management. In early February, for example, he attended a meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers at which Kosygin delivered a report on the annual plan. [REDACTED]

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//There is some evidence in fact that Chernenko is encountering resistance in his rapid rise to prominence. He had to share his fifth-ranking place on the election speech schedule with Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, and *Pravda* gave Gromyko more favorable space than Chernenko in printing their speeches. Chernenko also was last in protocol ranking among the nine Politburo members who flanked Brezhnev when the party leader delivered his speech in early March. Equally telling was Moscow television's coverage of Chernenko's election speech a few days earlier in Moldavia, which cast the inexperienced speaker in a poor light by showing his constituency whispering and squirming in evident dismay over their delegate's inept performance. The decision to edit the video clips in this way for the capital's audience can only have been politically inspired.// [REDACTED]

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The picture that emerges from these sometimes contradictory pieces of evidence is one of considerable fluidity in the relationships among the more senior Politburo members. This is in sharp contrast to the situation that prevailed from the early 1970s until at

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least 1977, a period when the seniors appeared to band together in a kind of self-protection society against ambitious junior members of the leadership. Conceivably, the breaking of the seniors' serried ranks began when Podgornyy was forced to yield his post of president to Brezhnev in mid-1977. With the death last July of Kulakov, who was the only viable "junior" candidate for succession among the Moscow-based Politburo members, Brezhnev's thrusting of his protege Chernenko into the senior ranks may have been seen by his older colleagues, particularly Kirilenko, as more dangerous than any challenge to their own positions that might be mounted by the juniors less well situated in the provinces.

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//In this new situation Brezhnev has created the conditions for increased political jockeying among the men who will be instrumental in determining the political succession.

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Chernenko will be given greater responsibilities and grow in stature while Kirilenko is undermined and weakened.//

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//The alternative is for Kirilenko and other seniors like Suslov to band together to protect themselves against Brezhnev and Chernenko. The stage may be set, therefore, for conflict among the leading contenders for power and perhaps major changes in the leadership even before Brezhnev leaves the scene.//

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